


































Cite this article: Brooks-Pollock E, Read JM,
House T, Medley GF, Keeling MJ, Danon L.
2021 The population attributable fraction
of cases due to gatherings and groups with
relevance to COVID-19 mitigation strategies.
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 376: 20200273.
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0273
Accepted: 17 April 2021
One contribution of 21 to a theme issue
‘Modelling that shaped the early COVID-19
pandemic response in the UK’.
Subject Areas:






e-mail: ellen.brooks-pollock@bristol.ac.uk© 2021 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original
author and source are credited.The population attributable fraction
of cases due to gatherings and
groups with relevance to COVID-19
mitigation strategies
Ellen Brooks-Pollock1,2, Jonathan M. Read3, Thomas House4,
Graham F. Medley5, Matt J. Keeling6 and Leon Danon7
1Bristol Veterinary School, University of Bristol, Bristol BS40 5DU, UK
2Population Health Sciences, Bristol Medical School, Bristol, BS8 2BN, UK
3Lancaster Medical School, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YW, UK
4Department of Mathematics, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UK
5Centre for Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Disease, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine,
London WC1H 9SH, UK
6Mathematics Institute and Department of Life Sciences, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
7Department of Engineering Mathematics, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1UB, UK
EB-P, 0000-0002-5984-4932; JMR, 0000-0002-9697-0962; TH, 0000-0001-5835-8062;
MJK, 0000-0003-4639-4765; LD, 0000-0002-7076-1871
Many countries have banned groups and gatherings as part of their response
to the pandemic caused by the coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2. Although there are
outbreak reports involving mass gatherings, the contribution to overall trans-
mission is unknown. We used data from a survey of social contact behaviour
that specifically asked about contact with groups to estimate the population
attributable fraction (PAF) due to groups as the relative change in the basic
reproduction number when groups are prevented. Groups of 50+ individuals
accounted for 0.5% of reported contact events, and we estimate that the PAF
due to groups of 50+ people is 5.4% (95% confidence interval 1.4%, 11.5%).
The PAF due to groups of 20+ people is 18.9% (12.7%, 25.7%) and the PAF
due to groups of 10+ is 25.2% (19.4%, 31.4%). Under normal circumstances
with pre-COVID-19 contact patterns, large groups of individuals have a rela-
tively small epidemiological impact; small- and medium-sized groups
between 10 and 50 people have a larger impact on an epidemic.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Modelling that shaped the early
COVID-19 pandemic response in the UK’.1. Introduction
Preventing social contacts has beenusedworldwide in 2020 to reduce transmission
of the novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2. Early restrictions introduced sought to limit
the number of people that could meet at one time. In the UK, Scotland banned all
large gatherings over 500 people inMarch 2020, and gatheringswere to be banned
in England but then the national stay-at-home order was introduced on 23 March
2020. As the first lockdown was eased, gatherings or more than 30 were banned,
which was then reduced to ‘the rule of six’ in September 2020 to prevent groups
of more than six individuals meeting simultaneously.
Given knowledge of transmission mechanisms, bringing together groups of
people into the same space should prove conducive for the spread of close-
contact infectious diseases. Indeed, gatherings have been associated with
outbreaks of communicable diseases such as measles [1], influenza [2] and
meningitis [3]. Public health agencies, including theWorld Health Organization,











contacts removing groups of 10+




















Figure 1. (a) The distribution in the number of social contacts per participants from the SCS (n = 5388) with and without groups of 10 and greater. Even without






































Factors such as the age of participant [1], zoonotic trans-
mission and the presence of animals [5], crowding [6,7], the
lack of sanitation [7] and location and event duration [6] are
associated with the reporting of mass gathering-related
outbreaks.
Despite the evidence of the importance of gatherings for
disease transmission from intuition and individual outbreaks,
the population-level impact of different mass gathering pol-
icies has not been established. While systematic reviews have
identified outbreak reports involving mass gatherings [5,6],
the overall impact of mass gatherings could not be quanti-
tatively assessed. A detailed modelling study of disease
transmission in the state of Georgia, USA, found that in
extreme scenarios when 25% of the population participated
in a 2-day long gathering shortly before the epidemic peak,
peak prevalence could increase by up to 10%. More realistic
scenarios resulted in minimal population-level changes [8].
The population attributable fraction (PAF) is a measure of
the importance of a risk factor to disease burden or death in a
population, borrowed from non-communicable disease epi-
demiology [9]. The PAF of a risk factor is the percentage of
disease burden or mortality that can be attributed to the pres-
ence of that increased risk; an example is the PAF of lung
cancer cases that are due to smoking. In previous work, we
demonstrated that for infectious diseases, the PAF can be esti-
mated as the percentage change in the basic reproduction
number (average number of secondary cases per infectious
case in an otherwise susceptible population [10]) in the coun-
terfactual situation where the risk factor is removed from the
population [11]. Here, we use representative data on individ-
uals’ daily social contacts, including group contacts, to
estimate the PAF due to groups and gatherings.2. Methods
(a) Social contact data
The social contact survey (SCS) [12,13] collected data on social
contacts from 5388 participants between 2009 and 2010 in theUK. Participants were asked to enumerate other people with
whom they had had contact over the course of a single day. Con-
tacts were defined as those with whom participants had a face-
to-face conversation within 3 m and/or physically touched
skin-on-skin. Participants were able to report individual contacts
and up to five groups of contacts, for instance church groups,
weddings, large work functions or multiple contacts at work.
The ‘groups’ question was designed to aid participants in report-
ing multiple similar contacts. Group contacts were defined in the
same way as individual contacts, i.e. if a person attended a con-
cert with 1000 people, but only spoke to five people, the number
of recorded group contacts would be five. Participants were
asked whether members of the group knew each other.
As well as the number of contacts, participants were asked to
estimate the length of time spent with each contact or group of
contacts as either: less than 10 min, 11–30 min, 31–60 min or
over 60 min, the distance from home, the frequency with which
the contact took place and whether it involved physical contact.
The SCS data are available to download at http://wrap.war
wick.ac.uk/54273/.(b) Reproduction numbers and population attributable
fraction
We calculate the basic reproduction number with and without
groups of various sizes. For each participant j, we use their jk con-
tact reports to calculate their individual reproduction number,
Rjind. We assumed that R
j
ind is proportional to the number of indi-
viduals reported in the contact, ni, (ni = 1 for single contacts, ni > 1





The duration of each contact is taken as the mid-point of each
time interval, i.e. 5 min, 20 min, 45 min and 6 h, as recorded by
the participant. The interpretation of contact duration is different
for individual versus group contacts, as there is a limit to the
number of face-to-face contacts that one person can make in a
finite time. We observe a saturation of contact duration for indi-
viduals with large numbers of contacts (figure 1b). The saturation
occurs between 20 and 30 contacts per individual. We adjust for





























groups that know each other
Figure 2. The PAF of cases due to groups of various sizes. The squares are all
groups and the triangles are groups of people who are known to each other.






































this by dividing the duration of group contacts by the number of
individuals in the group, when the number of group contacts is
greater than a random number between 20 and 30.
The population-level reproduction number is the average
number of secondary cases caused by an average infectious
person. Individuals with higher Rjind will contribute more to
the population-level Rt because they are more likely to get
infected than individuals with lower Rjind. Therefore, we estimate
Rt as a bootstrap resample (random sample with replacement) of




) j ¼ 1, . . . ,N, ð2:2Þ
where N is the number of participants in the SCS. The mean and
95% confidence interval (CI) were calculated from the boot-
strapped sample.
We calculated the PAF for groups of size G or greater as the
percentage change in the basic reproduction number:
PAFG ¼ 1 Rt (without groups  G)=Rt (with groups):
We investigate the PAF for groups of greater than 10, and up
to groups greater than 100, in increments of 10. We investigated
differences between groups that knew each other and groups that
did not know each other. 2733. Results
(a) Impact of groups on numbers of contacts
per person
A total of 48 001 unique contacts were reported by 5388 par-
ticipants. Of those, 42 945 (89%) were individual contacts and
5056 groups were reported (accounting for 11% of reported
contacts). The median and mean number of contacts per
person were 11.5 and 27.0, range 1 to 3011 (figure 1a).
Nearly half, 45%, of participants reported group contacts.
The majority of groups reported (3860; 76%) were groups of
people who knew each other; 2979 (59%) groups had 10 or
fewer members; the median and mean reported group size
was 9 and 20.3 individuals, respectively.
Restricting contacts to groups of size 50 or less reduces the
median and mean number of individual contacts per person
to 11.0 and 18.8; restricting contacts to groups of size 20 or
less reduces the median and mean number of contacts per
person to 10.0 and 14.1; restricting contacts to groups of
size 10 or less reduces the median and mean number of con-
tacts per person to 9 and 11.0. Figure 1 shows the degree
distribution (number of contacts) per person with and with-
out contacts associated with groups of size greater than 10.
Compared to individual contacts, group contacts were
more likely to be more than 2 miles from the participants
home (64% versus 51%), less likely to involve physical contact
(25% versus 44%) and more likely to involve new individuals
(21% versus 15%).(b) Population attributable fraction
The PAF due to groups decreased with increasing group size.
For the largest groups with more than 100 individuals the
PAF100 is estimated at 0.6% (95% CI: 0.4%, 0.8%). The
PAF50 is estimated at 5.5% (95% CI: 1.4%, 11.4%); the PAF20
is 18.9% (95% CI: 12.7%, 25.7%); the PAF10 is 25.2% (95%
CI: 19.4%, 31.4%) (figure 2).The pattern of decreasing PAF with increasing group size
is seen for both groups of individuals who are known to each
other and groups of individuals who are unknown to each
other. The PAF due to groups of 10+ known to each other
is estimated at 20.6% (95% CI: 15.4%, 26.3%) and due to
groups of 50+ known to each other is estimated at 2.9%
(95% CI: 0.8%, 6.9%). The remaining contribution to Rt is
due to contact with individuals.
The estimated impact of large groups on Rt is due to
the relative frequency with which they are reported in
the SCS, i.e. under normal (pre-COVID) contact patterns.4. Discussion
In this paper, we analysed social contact data in the context
of infectious disease transmission and gatherings. Our
findings suggest that large groups of individuals have a
relatively small impact on an epidemic, under the assump-
tion that contact patterns remain otherwise constant. This
is owing to the relative rarity of large-scale gatherings and
the sub-linear scaling between number of contacts
and infectivity.
The SCS is one of a number of social contact surveys that
have been conducted to quantify the impact of social mixing
on disease transmission [14–18]. The SCS specifically asked
about groups of similar contacts. These groups are not necess-
arily public or mass gatherings and represented groups that
both knew each other and those that did not. The group
sizes reported in the SCS were not necessarily the same size
of an event where contacts may have taken place. Therefore,
this analysis should be considered in terms of contacts per
person, rather than to guide the acceptable size of organized
events. The SCS asked about contacts on a single day and did
not capture multi-day events; simulation studies have shown
that prolonged mass gatherings were necessary to alter the
course of an epidemic [8]. Our analysis was based on social
contact data collected between 2009 and 2010; contact pat-






































account for individuals changing their behaviour if group
activities were cancelled.
In the context of COVID-19 mitigation, this analysis con-
sidered one aspect of gatherings: the impact on an epidemic.
However, there may be other valid reasons for preventing
mass events, such as policing and managing resources. Our
analysis implicitly assumes that infection is already present
in the population as is the case for COVID-19; for other dis-
eases, gatherings can be associated with increased global
travel which can bring new strains into an area or result in
out-of-season outbreaks, which were also not captured here.
Our findings illustrate the difficult choices that are necess-
ary to limit COVID-19 spread. Meetings of large groups of
more than 100 individuals are relatively infrequent, and
their prohibition may have a limited impact on the epidemic.
More epidemiologically relevant are groups of 10 to 20
people, as they occur more frequently and could potentially
have a larger impact on transmission; they may also involve
inter-generational family groups. This analysis was designed
to aid decision-making in the context of social distancing
measures to control COVID-19 and should be considered
against alternative control strategies so that the most effective
measures can be implemented in the long term. 273In context
This analysis of the impact of gatherings was submitted to the
Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Modelling on 11
March 2020. On that date, there had been 1297 confirmed
cases and 25 deaths attributable to COVID-19 in the UK.
The Italian government had imposed a national quarantine,
or ‘lockdown’, 2 days earlier and there were active discus-
sions about the scale and type of social distancing measures
that would be used in the UK.
Early restrictions sought to limit the number of people
that could meet at one time. On 12 March 2020, the First Min-
ister of Scotland announced that all large gatherings over 500
people would be cancelled from the following Monday, and
the UK Prime Minister announced on 13 March 2020 that
gatherings (of unspecified size) would be banned in England
from the following weekend. As it transpired, by the follow-
ing weekend, a national stay-at-home order was announced
in the UK. However, as the lockdown was eased, attention
turned back to the size of gatherings. An amendment to the
Coronavirus Health Protection Regulation 2020 was madein August 2020 that restricted organizing or facilitating gath-
erings of more than 30 persons. On 14 September 2020, ‘the
rule of six’ was introduced that prevented groups of more
than six individuals meeting simultaneously.
This paper was one piece of evidence that suggested
that minimal social distancing measures, such as banning
gatherings on their own, would not be sufficient to prevent a
large-scale epidemic in the UK. When we first conducted this
analysis in March 2020, we calculated the population-level
reproduction number as the unweighted mean of the individ-
ual reproduction numbers, which led to smaller attributable
fractions to groups. Ideally, we would have constructed a
who-infected-whom matrix, but the SCS did not contain the
age of contacts. Instead, to capture the fact that highly con-
nected individuals contribute more to the reproduction
number than lesswell-connected individuals,we used the indi-
vidual reproduction numbers as a weight with which to
calculate a weighted mean of reproduction numbers.
This analysis was conducted before genomic sequencing
could be used to quantify the role of superspreading and
large events. In a phylogenetic analysis of cases in the
Boston area, USA [19], 29% of cases were reported to be
responsible for 85% of secondary infections. In our analysis,
29% of participants reported 77% contacts. After accounting
for contact duration and risk of infection (as we do in the
paper), 29% of individuals contribute 84% of secondary
cases, suggesting that using social contact data is able to cap-
ture the overdispersion of superspreading. Other features of
large events, such as the increased distanced travelled to
group contacts, are not captured in our analysis.
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